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Abstract 
According to the Time-Based Resource-Sharing model (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & 
Camos, 2004), the cognitive load a given task involves is a function of the time during which 
it captures attention, thus impeding other attention demanding processes to take place. 
Accordingly, the present study demonstrates that the disruptive effect on concurrent 
maintenance of memory retrievals and response selections increases with their duration. 
Moreover, the effect on recall performance of concurrent activities does not go beyond their 
duration in so far as the processes are attention demanding. Finally, these effects are not 
modality specific, spatial processing disrupting verbal maintenance. These results suggest a 
sequential and time-based functioning of working memory in which processing and storage 
rely on a single and general purpose attentional resource needed to run executive processes 
devoted to construct, maintain and modify ephemeral representations.    
 
Key words: Working Memory, Cognitive load, Time, Executive Processes, Dual tasks 
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Working memory is one of the most heuristic and important concepts of cognitive 
psychology. Most of the theories that have followed the pioneering work of Baddeley and 
Hitch (1974) have suggested that working memory is a limited-capacity system in which 
some resource is shared between processing and storage, thus leading to a phenomenon of 
trade-off: performance decreases when the concurrent memory load increases, and any 
increase in difficulty of processing results in a loss of information from short-term storage 
memory (Anderson, Reder, & Lebiere, 1996; Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982; Conway & 
Engle, 1994; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Just & Carpenter, 1992). Within this theoretical 
framework, tasks would differ in the cognitive load they place in working memory, that is the 
amount of resource needed to carry them out. Though being intuitively appealing, the notions 
of resource and cognitive load have been the object of strong criticisms due to their vagueness 
(Navon, 1984; Towse & Houston-Price, 2001).  The aim of this article is to test the hypothesis 
that, far from being a vague metaphor, cognitive load is a function of the time during which a 
given activity captures attention, thus impeding other central processes to take place.  
The Resource-Sharing hypothesis 
As we noted above, the notion of cognitive load has not been universally accepted. For 
example, Towse & Hitch (1995; Hitch, Towse, & Hutton, 2001; Towse, Hitch, & Hutton, 
1998) have argued that the idea of a limited resource-sharing capacity is superfluous to 
account for working memory phenomena. In complex working memory span tasks in which 
memory items have to be maintained while performing a concurrent task, the loss of 
information would not result from the cognitive load of this intervening task but merely from 
its total duration. Longer processing times would result in longer delays of retention and, 
because memory traces suffer from a time-related decay, in poorer recall.  
To test this assumption, our research group systematically explored the effect on recall 
of processing components that varied either in duration or cognitive demand in a series of 
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studies using new working memory span tasks that are not self- but computer-paced 
(Barrouillet et al., 2004; Barrouillet & Camos, 2001; Gavens & Barrouillet, 2004; Lépine, 
Bernardin, & Barrouillet, 2005). It turned out that both factors have an effect on concurrent 
maintenance. First, in line with the resource-sharing hypothesis and contrary to Towse and 
Hitch’s model, it appeared that even when duration of processing is controlled, great 
differences in spans still appear as a function of the task. For example, solving arithmetic 
equations had a more detrimental effect on recall than a mere articulatory suppression 
(Barrouillet et al., 2004; Barrouillet & Camos, 2001; Gavens & Barrouillet, 2004). Second, 
and contrary to a widespread conception of cognitive load, even fairly simple tasks such as 
reading digits proved to have a highly detrimental effect on concurrent maintenance, provided 
that these tasks are performed under severe time constraints (Lépine et al., 2005; Lépine, 
Barrouillet, & Camos, 2005). To account for these phenomena, we proposed a new model of 
working memory, the Time-Based Resource-Sharing model (Barrouillet et al., 2004) that 
leads to a new conception of cognitive load in which time plays a crucial role.  
The Time-Based Resource-Sharing Model 
The TBRS model is based on four main assumptions. First, the model assumes that in 
most of the working memory span tasks, both processing and maintenance of information rely 
on the same limited resource that is the attention involved in voluntarily controlled processes. 
This kind of attention has been referred to as controlled attention by Engle, Kane, and 
Tuholski (1999) or as attention directed by the central executive in Cowan (1999). 
The second assumption is that many of the elementary cognitive steps involved in both 
processing and maintenance can only take place one at a time. We assume that this constraint 
can be described as an attentional or a central processing limitation. In the former account, the 
focus of attention can only select one element of knowledge at a time as the object of the next 
cognitive operation (Garavan, 1998; Oberauer, 2002, 2005). In the latter, the central processes 
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would be constrained by a central bottleneck applying to a variety of mental operations that 
are subject to voluntary control, such as response selection or memory retrieval (Pashler, 
1998). Thus, we will consider the two theoretical proposals as functionally equivalent, 
referring to the occupation of the central bottleneck or to the attentional capture as the same 
process. The main point is that when the focus of attention or the bottleneck is occupied by 
some processing episode, it is not available for the maintenance of memory items.  
The third assumption is that memory items on which attention focuses receive 
activation but, as soon as attention is switched away, this activation suffers from a time-
related decay (Cowan, 1995, 1999; Towse & Hitch, 1995). As a consequence, the memory 
traces of the items to be maintained fade away when attention is occupied by processing. The 
refreshment of these items before their complete disappearance necessitates their reactivation 
or reconstruction. This reactivation does not necessarily involve a rehearsal process as 
Baddeley described in his model of phonological loop (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Logie, 
1999). Rather, as demonstrated by Cowan (1992; Cowan et al., 1994), individuals can engage 
in a rapid and covert retrieval process through attentional focusing. 
The fourth assumption is that, due to the limitation of attention to only one element at a 
time and the time-related decay of memory traces outside the focus of attention, the sharing of 
attention is achieved through a rapid and incessant switching of attention from processing to 
maintenance. This rapid switching would occur during short pauses that would be freed while 
concurrent processing is running. We assume that a given task, though demanding it is, rarely 
induces a continuous capture of attention, because attention can be frequently diverted, even 
for short periods of time, towards other thoughts and brought back to the current activity.  
Time and Cognitive Load 
What is cognitive load within the TBRS model? The answer to this question lies in the 
four assumptions stated above. Those tasks that tend to continuously occupy attention impede 
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switching and involve a high cognitive load, whereas those tasks that permit frequent pauses 
and switches to other activities would involve a low cognitive load and should be experienced 
as less demanding. This theory was tested by Barrouillet et al. (2004) using a working 
memory task named the reading digit span task in which participants have to maintain and 
recall series of letters of ascending length while reading digits. The stimuli are presented on 
successive screens displaying either a letter to be remembered or a digit to be read. After each 
letter to be remembered, some digits are presented in succession at a fixed pace. Barrouillet et 
al. (2004) assumed that, when the processing component mainly involves retrievals, as in the 
reading digit span task, the cognitive load (CL) would correspond to 
(1) CL = a N / T  
where N corresponds to the number of retrievals, that is the number of digits to be read 
after each letter, a to a parameter that represents the time during which these retrievals capture 
attention, and T to the total time allowed to read the digits (i.e., the interletter interval). Thus, 
within the reading digit span task, cognitive load can be assimilated to the Number of 
retrievals / Time ratio. Increasing the number of retrievals while keeping the total time 
unchanged should reduce the possibility to free up interdigit pauses to retrieve and update the 
decaying memory traces, thus resulting in poorer recalls of letters. The same phenomenon 
should result from any reduction of the total time allowed to perform a constant number of 
retrievals. These predictions have been entirely confirmed: Barrouillet et al. (2004) observed 
that the recall performance decreased linearly when the Number of retrievals / Time ratio 
increased. However, though being in line with the TBRS model, the results reported in 
Barrouillet et al. (2004) do not constitute a comprehensive test of the model. Two main 
questions remain unanswered, both concerning the role of time in cognitive load and working 
memory functioning.  
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First, Barrouillet and colleagues manipulated the capture of attention induced by the 
processing component by varying the number of processing steps and the time allowed to 
perform them (Number of retrievals / Time ratio - parameters N and T in Equation 1). 
However, this procedure leads to confound cognitive load with the rate at which the stimuli 
are processed. A more direct manipulation is needed. Furthermore, Barrouillet et al. (2004) 
exclusively used verbal processing components involving retrieval from long term memory 
(i.e., reading digits or solving simple arithmetic problems). Within the TBRS model, the 
cognitive load a given task involves corresponds to the proportion of time during which this 
task captures attention, thus impeding concurrent activities that require central processes such 
as refreshing memory traces. Thus, even when both the number of stimuli to be processed and 
the total time allowed to process them remain unchanged (i.e., the N/T ratio), any increase in 
the duration of the attentional capture induced by each atomic processing step (parameter a in 
Equation 1) should lead to an increase in cognitive load and hence to lower recall 
performance. To test this hypothesis, we took advantage of the fact that the time needed to 
retrieve a given information from long-term memory or to select a given response can vary 
with the physical characteristics of the stimuli. In the first experiment presented in this article, 
we used a reading digit span task in which the time needed to read the digits was varied by 
manipulating their form (Arabic digits, number words, or canonical dice-patterns of dots). In a 
second experiment, the processing component consisted in a series of binary choices 
concerning the spatial location of a stimulus displayed on screen (either up or down) while 
maintaining letters. We varied the duration of these response selections by introducing a 
perceptual overlap between target stimuli, high levels of perceptual overlap inducing slower 
responses (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2004). 
Second, according to the TBRS model, cognitive load varies as a function of the 
proportion of time during which attention is captured. Whatever the task to be performed as 
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processing component within a working memory span task, recall performance would only 
depend on the duration of the attentional capture it elicits. Thus, Experiment 3 tested the 
hypothesis that the differences in span induced by different demanding processing 
components (memory retrieval and response selection) should disappear when processing 
times are equated across tasks. However, our model predicts that cognitive load depends on 
the duration of the activity in so far as this activity is attention demanding. In Experiment 4, 
we compared the effect on recall of two activities known to differ in attentional demand by 
comparing response selection with a simple reaction time task. We predicted that in this case, 
even if the two processes are equated in duration, response selection should have a stronger 
disruptive effect on concurrent maintenance than a simple reaction.   
Experiment 1 
The aim of this first experiment was to test the hypothesis that increasing the time 
during which an atomic processing step like memory retrieval captures attention results in a 
higher cognitive load and a more detrimental effect on concurrent maintenance. Though 
retrieving information from long-term memory may appear as a basic process, many factors 
affect its duration. For example, it is well known that words are better and faster retrieved as 
their frequency increases (Monsell, 1991). The retrieval of fact numbers is faster when the 
problems involve small than large operands (Ashcraft & Battaglia, 1978; Siegler & Shrager, 
1984, Zbrodoff & Logan, 2005). Goal-directed retrievals from long-term memory require 
controlled attention (Rosen & Engle, 1997), and we assume that differences in retrieval times 
reflect differences in the time during which the retrieval process captures attention and 
occupies the central bottleneck, exactly in the same way as Anderson et al. (1996) assumed 
that time and probability of retrieval reflect the amount of attention needed. Thus, we assume 
that the cognitive load involved by a given retrieval is a direct function of its duration: the 
slower this retrieval, the higher the cognitive load. 
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We tested this hypothesis by presenting adult participants with a reading digit span task 
in which they had to remember letters while reading digits aloud. The duration of the 
retrievals involved in reading digits was varied by manipulating the form in which digits were 
displayed on screen, either as words (e.g., “four”), Arabic digits (4) or canonical dice patterns 
(::), assuming that each of these forms allows a direct access to stored representations in long-
term memory (see Dehaene, 1992, and Dehaene & Cohen, 1995, for number words and 
Arabic digits, Mandler and Shebo,1982, for canonical dice-like configurations of dots). As a 
pretest made clear, it takes longer to identify a given number when presented in its dice-like 
than verbal or Arabic form. Thus, assuming that these longer response times reflect a longer 
capture of attention, we predicted that reading digit spans should be lower when the digits to 
be read are displayed as dice-like patterns of dots.            
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four undergraduate psychology students at the Université d’Aix-en-Provence 
(23 females) received a partial course credit for participating. Before being subjected to the 
three conditions of the reading digit span task (Arabic, words, dots), the participants 
performed a preliminary test aiming at evaluating their reading times in these three forms.  
Material and procedure 
All the experiments of this study were administered individually on screen by 
Psyscope software (Cohen, Mac Whinney, Flat, & Provost, 1993). During the preliminary 
test, participants were asked to read aloud 2 series of 24 items in each of the three forms 
(Arabic, words, dots), each number from 1 to 6 being presented four times in random order in 
each series. The order of completion of the three reading tasks was counterbalanced across 
participants. For each trial, a signal was centered on screen for 750 ms followed by the item to 
be identified after a delay of 350 ms. The reading times were measured using a voice key. 
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In a second phase, the participants performed the reading digit span task in which they 
had to memorize series of 1 to 6 consonants while reading numbers presented in three 
different formats (either as words, Arabic digits or patterns of dots) defining three 
experimental conditions. In this experiment and all the following, all the consonants were 
used except W which is trisyllabic in French, with repetitions, acronyms, and alphabetic 
ordered strings avoided. There were 2 series of consonants of each length in each of these 
experimental conditions resulting in 3 blocks of 12 series of letters to be remembered. Across 
the participants, these blocks were affected to the three experimental conditions following a 
Latin square in such a way that each series of letters was studied in each experimental 
condition. Each series began by a signal (an asterisk) that was displayed on screen for 750 ms 
and followed, after a delay of 500 ms, by the first letter. Each letter was displayed for 1500 
ms and followed by 4 numbers randomly selected from 1 to 6 successively displayed on 
screen during 1200 ms after a delay of 300 ms. This resulted in a pace of a number every 
1500 ms. These numbers were displayed as Arabic digits (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), French number 
words from 1 to 6, or patterns of dots and appeared with the same frequency in each 
experimental condition. At the end of the series, the word “Recall” appeared on screen and the 
participants had to verbally recall the letters in the correct order. The 36 series were presented 
in a random order, the participants being informed about the length and the form of the 
numbers (Arabic digits, words, or dots) of the forthcoming series.  
The experimental session was preceded by a familiarization phase in which the 
participants read 3 series of 4 numbers in each of their three different forms and performed 2 
trials of the span task for the lengths 1 and 2 in each experimental condition.  
Results and discussion 
The preliminary test confirmed that it takes longer to read digits presented as patterns of 
dots (507 ms) rather than in their word or Arabic forms (425 ms and 424 ms respectively), 
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F(2,46) = 132.50, !p
2 = .85, p < . 001, whereas these two latter response times did not differ, 
F < 1 (Table 1). Recall performance was assessed by computing both the rate of letters 
correctly recalled whatever the order and the rate of letters recalled in correct position within 
the series. As we predicted, the pattern of dots, which involved the longest reading times, 
elicited a lower rate of letters correctly recalled (87%) than both the Arabic digits and the 
number words (90% in both conditions), F(2,46) = 3.43, !p
2 = .13, p < . 05, a difference that 
was even clearer when order recall was taken into account (75% with dot patterns compared 
to 82% with both Arabic digits and number words conditions), F(2,46) = 5.48, !p
2 = .19, p < 
. 01. It can be noted that this pattern of recall performance perfectly matched differences in 
reading times, with longer reading times resulting in poorer recall whereas equivalent reading 
times resulted in equivalent rates of correct recall. We replicated these findings in another 
experiment in which we used Roman numerals instead of patterns of dots. In line with the 
present results, Roman numerals, which induced longer reading times, involved lower recall 
performance1. 
Taken together, these facts lent strong support to the hypothesis put forward by 
Barrouillet et al. (2004) that the cognitive load induced by the processing component within 
the reading digit span task depends not only on the number of retrievals to be performed and 
the total time allowed to perform them, but also on the time during which these retrievals 
capture attention and block the central bottleneck. As the TBRS model postulates, parameter a 
in Equation 1 appears to play a major role in determining the cognitive load a given task 
involves. However, our model predicts that not only retrievals from long term memory, but 
any attention demanding process should have a detrimental effect on maintenance and that 
this effect should depend on the duration of this process. The following experiment explored 
this issue. 
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Experiment 2 
The aim of this experiment was to assess the effect on concurrent maintenance of a 
secondary task that does not involve memory retrievals but a response selection process, the 
duration of which was manipulated. Several studies have demonstrated that response selection 
interferes with retrievals from long-term memory, suggesting that these two central processes 
compete for some common supply, which is probably executive control (e.g., Rohrer and 
Pashler, 2003; Szmalec, Vandierendonck, & Kemps, 2005), a hypothesis corroborated by 
imaging techniques (Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen, & Gabrieli, 2002; Rowe, Toni, 
Josephs, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000). According to the TBRS model, response 
selection should thus disrupt concurrent maintenance of information by impeding the 
refreshment of the decaying memory traces. Moreover, this effect should be more pronounced 
when response selection takes longer, something that we never investigated. The present 
experiment tested this hypothesis using a working memory span task with the same structure 
as the reading digit span task: participants had to maintain and recall series of letters but the 
reading digit task was replaced by a serial choice reaction time task. Within each interletter 
interval, a black square appeared repeatedly on screen at a fixed pace, centered in two 
possible locations (either in the upper or lower part of the screen), participants being asked to 
judge this location by pressing one of two identified keys. We varied the duration of these 
response selections by manipulating the discriminability of the targets. In a “distant” 
condition, the two locations were clearly distinct, whereas in a “close” condition, the distance 
between the two locations was reduced to 5 mm. The resulting perceptual overlap between 
targets in the latter condition slowed down the selection of response, as the measure of 
response times during the task confirmed. We predicted that, all other things being equal, the 
“close” condition should have a more detrimental effect on maintenance and result in poorer 
recalls.   
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Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four undergraduate psychology students at the Université de Bourgogne (21 
females) received a partial course credit for participating. 
Material and procedure 
Participants were seated about 60 cm from the computer screen and were presented with 
series of 3 to 8 consonants to be remembered. Each consonant was followed by a series of 8 
stimuli successively displayed on screen. These stimuli consisted in a black square (side = 18 
mm subtending 2 degrees in visual angle) centered on one of two possible locations either in 
the upper or the lower part of the screen. In the distant condition, the two locations were 68 
mm apart (6.5 degrees in visual angle), whereas in the overlapping condition, this distance 
was reduced to 5 mm (0.5 degrees in visual angle), thus creating a 13 mm overlap between the 
two target squares. For each length, 3 series of consonant were associated with each condition 
of discriminability in the serial choice RT task, resulting in a total of 36 series of consonants 
to be remembered that were presented to each participant. 
Each series began by a ready signal (an asterisk) centered on screen for 750 ms, 
followed after a 500 ms delay by the first letter presented for 1500 ms. After a post-letter 
delay of 500 ms, each of the 8 stimuli of the serial choice RT task appeared for 666 ms and 
was followed by a delay of 333 ms for a total of 1s per stimulus. The following consonant 
thus appeared for 1500 ms and so on. At the end of the series, the word “Recall” was 
displayed on screen. The 36 series were randomly presented, the participant being informed 
about the length and level of discriminability of each series (e.g., “close stimuli / 3 letters”, 
“distant stimuli / 7 letters”). In each condition and each series, the squares were randomly 
displayed in the upper and the lower locations with the same frequency. Participants were 
asked to read aloud each letter, to judge the location of each square as fast as possible without 
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sacrificing accuracy by pressing either a left or a right-handed key for the lower and the upper 
location respectively, and then to write down the remembered letters in correct order by filling 
out frames containing the appropriate number of boxes when recall was required. Besides the 
letters recalled, reaction times and accuracy during the serial choice task were recorded. 
A training phase familiarized participants with the serial choice RT task (9 series of 8 
stimuli in each discriminability condition with a 80% correct criterion requested) and then 
with the working memory task with three series of letters and stimuli to be processed (a “close 
stimuli / 5 letters”, a “distant stimuli / 8 letters”, and a “close stimuli / 3 letters”).  
Results and discussion 
All the participants reached the 80% correct criterion during their training phase  
and participated in the experimental session. Concerning the serial choice RT task, the close 
condition was more difficult than the distant condition (87% and 97% of correct responses 
respectively), t (23) = 11.87, p < .001, and, as we anticipated, resulted in longer RTs (377 ms 
and 314 ms respectively), t (23) = 13.45, p < .001. As we predicted, these longer processing 
times had a disruptive effect on memory. As in Experiment 1, recall performance was 
assessed by computing both the rate of letters correctly recalled whatever the order and the 
rate of letters recalled in correct position within the series. With both measures, the close 
condition resulted in poorer recalls than the distant condition (86%, SD = 14, and 92%, SD = 
7, of letters correctly recalled respectively; 75%, SD = 16, and 83%, SD = 10, when order was 
taken into account), t (23) = 2.71, p < .02, and t (23) = 3.07, p < .01, respectively. Thus, this 
experiment extended the facts previously observed with retrievals from long-term memory to 
the response selection process. Increasing the duration of successive response selections has a 
disruptive effect on concurrent maintenance exactly as we observed with memory retrievals.  
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Discussion of Experiments 1 and 2 
The aim of this first part was to establish that the cognitive load a given task involves 
varies as a function of the proportion of time during which it captures attention, even when 
the number of stimuli to be processed and the total time allowed to process them remain 
unchanged. This was demonstrated with memory retrievals and response selections. In each 
case, increasing the duration of processing that remains unchanged in nature has a disruptive 
effect on concurrent maintenance. Even relatively small increases in the time during which 
attention is distracted have an effect on recall. The fact that this effect is not task- or process-
specific and not restricted to memory retrievals but extends to response selection reinforces 
the hypothesis that the locus of the effect lies in the attentional capture induced by both 
processes. This phenomenon corresponds to one of the main predictions of the TBRS model, 
because the duration of these processes is commensurate with, and then reflects the time 
during which they occupy the central bottleneck, thus impeding other attention demanding 
operations to take place, and particularly the covert retrievals needed to refresh decaying 
memory traces in short term memory. However, the TBRS model goes further by claiming 
that the time during which the central bottleneck is occupied is the sole determinant of 
cognitive load. In other words, mental activities involving cognitive processes differing in 
nature should induce the same cognitive load if these processes occupy the central bottleneck 
for equivalent periods of time. This question was addressed in the two following experiments.  
Experiment 3 
The first part of this article demonstrated that both memory retrieval and response 
selection have a disruptive effect on maintenance commensurate with their duration. The 
present experiment compared the effect of these two processes when involved as processing 
components in working memory span tasks. The task we used had the same structure as a 
reading digit span task. Participants were asked to remember series of letters while processing 
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strings of digits successively displayed on screen, but the digits appeared either above or 
below a line centered on screen. Apart from varying the number of digits presented within 
constant interletter intervals, we manipulated the nature of the task to be performed on these 
digits by asking participants to perform either a parity or a location judgment by responding 
“odd” or “even” in the former condition, “above” or “below” in the latter by pressing 
appropriate keys. It is known that information about the parity of small numbers is associated 
with their Arabic representation and directly retrieved from long-term memory when needed 
(Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993). Thus, the parity judgment task involves memory 
retrieval as well as the selection of the response induced by the retrieved information. By 
contrast, the location judgment task involves a response selection but no retrieval from long-
term memory.  
As already shown by Barrouillet et al. (2004), recall performance should decrease as the 
number of stimuli within the interletter intervals increases, but the predictions of interest were 
those related to the differences between tasks. First, because it requires an additional memory 
retrieval and prolonged capture of attention, the parity judgment task should induce lower 
spans than the location judgment task. Second, although the two tasks rely on different 
cognitive processes, their effect on maintenance should not go beyond the time during which 
they capture attention, and they should have the same effect on spans if they took the same 
time. As a consequence, any differences in recall performance should disappear when the 
duration of the two tasks is controlled.  
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-seven undergraduate psychology students at the Université de Bourgogne (84 
females) received a partial course credit for participating and were randomly assigned to one 
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of the 6 experimental groups defined by the factorial design 2 Tasks (parity vs. location 
judgment) x 3 Numbers of stimuli within the interletter intervals (4, 6, or 8). 
Material and procedure 
Participants in each of the 6 experimental groups were presented with the same series of 
consonants of ascending length  (from 1 to 7) with 3 series of each length. The 21 resulting 
series contained a total of 84 letters, each being followed by strings of either 4, 6, or 8 stimuli 
consisting in a number from 1 to 10 displayed in its Arabic form either above or below a 
horizontal line centered on screen. In each condition (i.e., 4, 6, or 8 stimuli) the stimuli 
appeared in a fixed random order, with as many even as odd numbers equally distributed 
between the two possible locations. Thus, in both task conditions (parity and location), 
participants saw exactly the same strings of stimuli.  
First, the participants were asked to focus for 750 ms on a signal (an asterisk) centered 
on screen, which was replaced, after a delay of 500 ms by the first letter to be remembered. 
The letters were displayed on screen for 1500 ms and followed by a delay of 500 ms before a 
string of stimuli to be processed appeared. Within these strings, each stimulus was displayed 
on screen for either 1067 ms, 711 ms, or 533 ms and followed by a delay of either 533 ms, 
356 ms or 267 ms for the 4-, 6-, and 8-stimuli conditions respectively. Thus, the time 
available to process a stimulus was 1600 ms, 1067 ms, and 800 ms for the 4-, 6-, and 8-
stimuli conditions respectively, resulting in a constant interletter interval of 6400 ms. At the 
end of the string of stimuli, either the word “recall” or a second letter appeared and so on.  
The participants were asked to read aloud and to remember the letters. According to the 
condition they were assigned to, they had to judge, for each stimuli, either the parity of the 
number or its location by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard: one on the right for the 
“even” and “above” responses, another on the left for the “odd” and “below” responses. The 
computer recorded the nature of the response as well as reaction times. When the word 
Time and Cognitive Load 18 
“recall” appeared, the participants had to recall aloud the series of letters in the correct order. 
They were presented with increasingly long series of letters until they failed to recall the 
letters of all three series at a particular level. Testing was terminated at this point. Each 
correctly recalled series counted as one third; the total number of thirds was added up to 
provide a span score (Barrouillet et al., 2004; Conlin, Gathercole, & Adams, 2005). For 
example, the correct recall of all the series of 1, 2, and 3 letters, of 2 series of 4 letters and 1 
series of 5 letters resulted in a span of (3 + 3 + 3 + 2 + 1) x 1/3 = 3.67. 
Before the experimental session, participants were given a training phase in which they 
performed at the same pace as in the forthcoming experiment either the parity or the location 
judgment task on 96 items (i.e., either 24, 16, or 12 strings of 4, 6, and 8 stimuli respectively 
at the paces described above). They received feedback for errors and had to obtain at least 
80% of correct responses to continue; if not, they were asked again to train with the same 
block of items. Then, three 1-letter and three 2-letter training series of the working memory 
span task were presented. 
Results 
One participant who did not achieve the criterion of 80% of correct responses on the 
parity task was discarded from the analyses. The remaining 96 participants reached high rates 
of correct responses (91% and 97% for the parity and the locations tasks respectively), and all 
the recalls were taken into account. We will first report the data concerning working memory 
spans and then the results and analyses concerning processing times. 
Working memory span analyses 
We performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the working memory spans with 
the type of task (parity and location) and the number of stimuli (4, 6, and 8) as between-
subject factors. In line with our predictions, the parity judgment task induced a lower mean 
span than the location judgment task (4.48 and 5.23 respectively), F (1,90) = 19.64, !p
2 = .18, 
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p < .001 (Table 2), and the mean spans decreased as the number of items to be processed 
within the interletter intervals increased (5.36, 5.05, and 4.15 for 4, 6, and 8 stimuli 
respectively), F (2,90) = 18.67, !p
2 = .29, p < .001. There was no significant interaction, F 
(2,90) = 1.10, !p
2 = .02, p = .34. Thus, the difference in spans produced by the parity and the 
location judgment tasks conformed to our expectations. However, our main prediction was 
that this effect is only due to differences in duration. 
Responses times analyses 
 Two kinds of response time measures were of interest. The first was the mean response 
time (RT) reflecting the time needed to process a stimulus in a given experimental condition. 
Mean RT can be considered as an index of the difficulty of the task. For this purpose, we 
calculated individual mean RTs from the total amount of stimuli for which a given participant 
gave a response (i.e., excluding non responses but taking incorrect responses into account). 
The second was the mean total processing time (!PT in Tables), which corresponds to the 
total time devoted to process the stimuli within the interletter intervals (i.e., the total of the 
RTs per string of stimuli). This last measure can be considered as reflecting the product aN in 
Equation 1 but it did not simply correspond to the mean RT multiplied by the number of 
stimuli per string due to rare but existing non responses that we considered, for sake of 
simplicity, as involving no processing at all. 
We performed an ANOVA on the individual mean RTs with the same factors as for the 
mean spans (Table 2). As we expected, parity judgments elicited longer RTs than location 
judgments (554 ms and 411 ms respectively), F (1,90) = 120.09, !p
2 = .57, p < .001. 
Interestingly, these RTs decreased when the number of stimuli to process increased (556 ms, 
469 ms, and 422 ms for 4, 6, and 8 stimuli respectively), F (2,90) = 36.12, !p
2 = .44, p < .001, 
a phenomenon that was observed in both tasks without significant interaction, F < 1. This 
suggests that participants cope with the secondary task by some speed / accuracy trade off. 
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When the number of stimuli and thus time pressure increased, participants gave faster but, as 
we reported above, less accurate responses. 
Of course, these differences in RTs resulted in differences in total processing times, 
which were longer for the parity than the location task (3147 ms and 2351 ms respectively), F 
(1,90) = 186.47, !p
2 = .67, p < .001, and obviously increased in both conditions with the 
number of stimuli to process (Table 2). The question of interest was to establish if the 
differences in spans observed between the parity and the location conditions would persist if 
both tasks involved similar processing times. We thus introduced individual total processing 
times as covariate in the ANOVA on mean spans described above. The total processing times 
had a strong effect on spans, F (1,89) = 47.70, !p
2 = .35, p < .001. The F value associated with 
the effect of the number of stimuli was reduced from 18.67 to 4.75 but remained significant, p 
< .05, !p
2 = .05. This remaining effect suggests that the impact of the number of stimuli to be 
processed while maintaining memory traces goes beyond the effect of the total duration of 
processing. The higher number of attentional switches between processing and maintenance 
resulting from an increasing number of items to be processed could account for this 
phenomenon, because switching is a demanding process the cognitive cost of which is not 
taken into account by measuring total processing time (Liefooghe, Barrouillet, 
Vandierendonck, & Camos, submitted). By contrast, and as we predicted, the F value 
associated with the effect of task dropped from 19.64 to 0.10, an effect that was no longer 
significant, p = .75, !p
2 = .001, demonstrating that the effect of task was almost entirely 
underpinned by processing time differences.  
A way to illustrate this phenomenon is to compare the equations resulting from the 
linear regressions of the mean spans on the mean total processing times per group for both 
tasks. More precisely, span scores were regressed on the Total Processing Time / Total Time 
Allowed ratio, the total time allowed corresponding to the duration of the interletter interval 
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(here 6400 ms + 500 ms of post-letter delay = 6900 ms) (Figure 1). In line with what is 
predicted by the TBRS model, the two slopes (- 7.82 and – 7.68 for the parity and the location 
tasks respectively) were very close, t < 1, as well as the two intercepts (8.04 and 7.84 
respectively), suggesting that recall performance was almost entirely determined by the time 
allocated to the processing component rather than by its nature. Another way to illustrate this 
phenomenon was to calculate the extrapolated mean spans for the location judgment task if it 
had taken the same total processing time as the parity judgment task, using the parameters of 
the regression line indicated above (slope = -7.68; intercept = 7.84). The extrapolated means 
were 5.10, 4.23, and 3.70 for 4, 6, and 8 stimuli respectively, which can be compared to the 
observed mean spans for the parity judgment task that were 5.16, 4.58, and 3.69 respectively. 
There was no significant difference between the two series of values, ps > .25.  
Discussion 
Two main facts arose from this experiment. As we expected, the parity judgment task 
that involves memory retrieval and response selection has a more detrimental effect on 
concurrent maintenance than the location judgment task that only involves response selection. 
An additional attention demanding cognitive step such as memory retrieval extends the time 
during which the task blocks the central bottleneck, resulting in a higher cognitive load and an 
amplified memory loss. However, is this effect really a matter of time as we predicted? This 
would suggest that memory retrieval and response selection do not differ in their effect on 
concurrent maintenance beyond the amount of time they capture attention. The present 
experiment demonstrated that both processes have actually the same effect. Indeed, when 
processing time was controlled, activities that differ in nature have effects on recall 
performance that can no longer be distinguished. However, it could hastily be concluded from 
the previous experiments that the cognitive load a given activity involves is a direct function 
of its raw duration. The aim of the following experiment was to establish that cognitive load 
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is commensurate with the duration of the task in so far as this task entails a sizeable 
attentional demand. 
Experiment 4 
 This last experiment tested the hypothesis that activities that place a negligible 
demand on executive processes should have, if any, moderate effects on spans, whatever their 
raw duration. For this purpose, we compared a choice RT and a simple RT tasks as processing 
components within working memory span tasks. Several authors have claimed that the choice 
RT task involves a series of processes requiring executive control that do not come into play 
in the simple RT task such as stimulus discrimination (Cavina-Pratisi et al., 2006; Di Russo, 
Taddei, Apnile, & Spinelli, 2006; Neubauer & Knorr, 1997; Schluter, Krams, Rushworth, & 
Passingham, 2001), stimulus-response mapping (Gilbert, Simons, Frith, & Burgess, 2006; 
Stuss, Binns, Murphy, & Alexander, 2002), and response selection (Cavina-Pratesi et al., 
2006; Donders, 1868; Frith & Done, 1986; Schluter et al, 2001; Schubert, 1999; Stuss et al., 
2002). This difference in executive control implication has been corroborated by Szmalec, 
Verbruggen, De Baene, and Vandierendonck (under revision) using imaging techniques. 
Accordingly, it has been demonstrated that choice RT tasks interfere with serial recall 
whereas simple RT tasks do not (Vandierendonck, De Vooght, & Van der Goten, 1998; 
Szmalec et al., 2005). Of course, the simple RT task at least involves input monitoring and, as 
Deschuyteneer and Vandierendonck (2005) noted, it is implausible to assume that this process 
does not entail any executive control. However, the facts reported above suggest that a simple 
reaction consecutive to stimulus detection does not engage executive control and attention in 
the same extent as response selection does. 
Thus, we assumed that by comparing the effect on maintenance of a choice and a 
simple RT tasks, we compared two processing components that strongly differ in the amount 
of executive control and attention they involve. The design of the present experiment was 
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basically the same as in Experiment 3, except that it was not a digit but a dot that appeared 
either above or below the horizontal line. In the choice RT condition, participants were asked 
to judge the location of this dot, whereas in the simple RT condition, they were just asked to 
press a key as quickly as possible every time it appeared on screen, whatever its location. If 
the cognitive load of the processing component and its impact on recall depend on the 
duration of the attentional capture it involves rather than in its raw duration, two main 
hypotheses can be drawn. The first, which is not specific to the TBRS model, predicts that the 
choice RT condition will result in lower spans than the simple RT condition, as already 
observed by Szmalec et al. (2005). The second hypothesis, derived from the TBRS model, 
predicts that increasing the number of stimuli while keeping unchanged the total time 
available to process them should induce a strong decrease in working memory spans in the 
choice RT condition but a negligible effect in the simple RT task conditions. As a 
consequence, and contrary to what we observed in Experiment 3, when equated in duration, 
the two tasks should still differ in the working memory spans they elicit. 
Method 
Participants 
Hundred fourteen undergraduate psychology students at the Université de Bourgogne 
(107 females) participated for partial fulfillment of a course requirement. One additional 
participant also took part, but this participant could not continue the experimental session due 
to technical problems. Sixty-four of them were assigned to the simple RT condition; the 
remaining 50 participants participated in the choice RT condition. Within these conditions, 
the participants were randomly assigned to one of the subconditions defined by the number of 
stimuli in the interletter interval (5, 7, or 9 stimuli in the choice RT condition; 5, 7, 9, or 11 in 
the simple RT condition). 
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Material  and procedure 
All participants, irrespective of the task and the condition they were assigned to, were 
asked to read out loud and memorize the same series of consonants of ascending length (from 
3 to 8 letters) with three series of each length, resulting in 18 series (i.e., a total of 99 letters). 
Each series of letters began by an asterisk that was centrally displayed on screen for 750 ms 
and replaced by the first letter after a delay of 500 ms. In the choice RT condition, each letter 
was presented for 1500 ms and followed by either 5, 7 or 9 successive dots situated randomly 
above or below a horizontal line. In the simple RT condition, letters were also presented for 
1500 ms, but were followed by either 5, 7, 9 or 11 such dots. The 11-stimuli condition was 
added to obtain a processing time in the simple RT task comparable to the one in the 9-
stimulus condition in the choice RT task. Regardless of the number of stimuli involved in the 
intervening task (5, 7, 9 or 11), the duration of the interletter intervals was kept constant to 
6750 ms. Within this interval, each dot was presented 250 ms on screen, accounting for 1250 
ms, 1750 ms, 2250 ms and 2750 ms for 5, 7, 9  and 11 stimuli respectively, the remaining 
time being divided in 6, 8 , 10 and 12 different durations of delays respectively. The different 
delays were fixed to 580 ms, 710 ms, 840 ms, 970 ms, 1100 ms and 1230 ms for 5 stimuli; 
353 ms, 431 ms, 507 ms, 587 ms, 663 ms, 741 ms, 819 ms and 899 ms for 7 stimuli; 250 ms, 
294 ms, 339 ms, 383 ms, 428 ms, 472 ms, 517 ms, 561 ms, 606 ms and 650 ms for 9 stimuli; 
and 250 ms, 264 ms, 282 ms, 296 ms, 313 ms, 326 ms, 343 ms, 353 ms, 369 ms, 384 ms, 400 
ms and 420 ms for 11 stimuli. For each inter-letter interval, these delays were randomly 
inserted as either the post-letter delay (i.e., the delay that followed the letter) or as one of the 
post-dot delays (i.e., the delay that followed one of the dots). In this way, the duration of the 
interletter interval was kept constant while the duration of the interstimulus intervals was 
randomized. Thus, the dots appeared at an unpredictable rhythm, preventing completion of the 
simple RT task by learning and reproducing a steady rhythm. Participants were instructed 
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either to judge the location of the dot (above or below the horizontal line) in the choice RT 
task by pressing the same keys as in Experiment 3, or to react as quickly as possible every 
time a dot appeared on screen in the simple RT task by pressing the right key. When the word 
“recall” appeared on screen at the end of the series, participants were instructed to recall the 
letters in their order of appearance. After registering the oral recall, the experimenter started 
the next series. 
For each task, a training session preceded the experimental series. First, according to 
the condition they were assigned to, participants were presented with about 120 stimuli (i.e., 
24 series of 5 dots, 17 series of 7 dots, 13 series of 9 dots, or 11 series of 11 dots), in order to 
train the fast and accurate execution of the secondary task. Every time the participant 
committed an error or did not respond fast enough (i.e., within 500 ms), they heard a beep. To 
continue the training session, participants had to attain a percentage of 80% correct responses 
(the correct response in the simple RT task was pressing the key before the next dot or letter 
appears). If not, they were presented with the same training stimuli once again. When 
participants failed to attain 80% after three such attempts, the experiment was terminated. 
When this first part was completed, the training session was continued with two 3-letter and 
two 4-letter series in which participants had to maintain the letters while carrying out the 
secondary task. The same stop rule as in the previous experiments was used, as well as the 
same method for calculating span scores, except that we added 2 to the total because this 
experiment used series of ascending length starting from 3 letters instead of 1.  
Results 
Though the choice RT task was more difficult than the simple RT task (91% compared 
to 94% of correct responses), all the participants except 2 of them in the training session of 
the choice RT condition reached the criterion of 80% of correct responses in both the training 
and the experimental sessions, resulting in 16 participants in each condition.  
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Responses times analyses 
As in Experiment 3, we analyzed the mean RT as well as the total processing times 
(Table 3). Both in the choice RT and the simple RT condition, the effect of the number of 
stimuli on mean RT was not significant, respectively F (2,45) = 1.10, !p
2 = .05, p = .34; F < 1. 
The fact that the mean RT did not vary with the number of stimuli, contrary to what was 
observed in Experiment 3, suggests that the unpredictable rhythm prevented any planning in 
processing stimuli. Not surprisingly, ANOVAs on the total processing times in both the 
choice RT condition and the simple RT condition revealed a main effect of number of stimuli, 
respectively F (2,45) = 137.29, !p
2 = .86, p < .001; F (3,60) = 93.08, !p
2 = .82, p < .001. 
Working memory span analyses 
We performed an ANOVA on the working memory spans in the choice RT condition 
with the number of stimuli per interletter interval (5, 7, and 9) as between-subject factors 
(Table 3). In line with our predictions, the increase in the number of stimuli to process led to a 
decrease in span when participants had to perform the choice RT task (mean spans of 5.50, 
5.10, and 4.14 for 5, 7, and 9 stimuli), F(2,45) = 8.70, !p
2 = .28, p < .001. Conversely, an 
ANOVA on the working memory spans in the simple RT condition with the number of 
stimuli per interletter interval (5, 7, 9 and 11) as between-subject factors showed that the 
number of stimuli did not have any significant effect on spans (mean spans of 5.31, 5.25, 5.13 
and 5.33 for 5, 7, 9 and 11 stimuli), F < 1. As we did in Experiment 3, span scores were 
regressed on the Total Processing Time / Total Time Allowed ratio, the total time allowed 
corresponding to the duration of the interletter interval (here 6750 ms) for the 7 groups 
involved in Experiment 4. Two main facts arose. First, the variations on spans produced by 
varying the number of stimuli in the choice RT task resulted in a slope slightly steeper than 
those observed in Experiment 3 for the parity and the location judgment tasks (- 8.19 
compared to - 7.82 and - 7.68 respectively), with an intercept slightly lower (7.66 compared 
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to 8.04 and 7.84). These small differences could be due to the irregular pace at which the 
stimuli appeared in Experiment 4, whereas the pace was regular in both conditions of 
Experiment 3, which probably resulted in a more attention demanding task. Second, the slope 
associated with the simple RT task was, as we predicted, practically nil (- 0.05) and 
significantly different from the slope associated with the choice RT task, t (108) = 18.40. 
These last analyses made clear that a succession of simple reactions in response to stimuli 
does not impede concurrent maintenance of information in short-term memory whereas 
performing binary spatial choices on the same stimuli has a strong impact on recall 
performance. Accordingly, though the 11-stimuli condition of the simple RT task involved 
approximately the same mean total processing time as the 9-stimulus condition of the choice 
RT task (2910 ms and 2831 ms respectively), it elicited a higher working span (5.33 
compared to 4.14), t(30) = 3.78, p < .001. 
Discussion 
As we expected, this experiment demonstrated that not all the cognitive activities have 
an effect on concurrent maintenance commensurate with their duration: those activities that 
do not solicit central processes for sizeable portion of time have no measurable impact on 
span. The implications of this fact are of importance. It makes clear that the effect on spans of 
the simple activities we use in our computer-paced working memory span tasks is not merely 
due to some distraction induced by events that burst into participants’ field of vision while 
they are trying to remember items. If this were the case, and contrary to what we observed, 
increasing the number of events would worsen recall performance. Moreover, it demonstrates 
that cognitive load is not a simple matter of time. Although the total processing time increased 
with more items to be processed, the spans were not significantly affected when participants 
were just asked to detect these items instead of analyzing them to select appropriate answer. 
As the TBRS model predicted, what matters is not the raw duration of an activity but the time 
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during which attention is captured and central processes are occupied. Taken together, the sets 
of results gathered in the two parts of this article delineates a conception of working memory 
and cognitive load that we shall confront with other conception and theories in the following 
general discussion.  
General discussion  
The present study tested and confirmed the predictions issuing from the TBRS model 
concerning the relationships between time and cognitive load. Our findings have implications 
for three main questions related to working memory structure and functioning: the role of 
time in working memory, the relationships between processing and storage, and the nature of 
the mechanisms that underpin the loss of information from working memory. We will address 
these three points in turn. 
Time and working memory 
The two first experiments demonstrated that the cognitive load induced by a task 
involving executive processes (memory retrievals or response selection) does not only depend 
on the amount of information to be processed and the rate of processing, but also on the 
duration of the atomic processing steps. Experiment 3 showed that the effect on concurrent 
maintenance of activities differing in the nature of the central processes they involve is 
commensurate with, and does not go beyond their duration. These two facts suggest that the 
detrimental effect of processing activities on the concurrent maintenance of memory items 
depends on the time during which some resource or supply, which is recruited by memory 
retrievals but also by response selections, is occupied. The simplest way in accounting for this 
fact is to assume (a) that some central system is in charge of the mental operations needed to 
perform both the secondary task and the maintenance of memory items, (b) that this system is 
characterized by a sequential functioning, and (c) that memory traces suffer from a time-
related degradation while this system is occupied by secondary task processes. Moreover, it 
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seems from Experiment 4 that not all activities occupy to the same extent this system, 
suggesting that it is mainly involved in central processes known as executive functions. This 
system, that can be indifferently described as a central bottleneck (Pashler, 1998) or as the 
focus of attention (Cowan, 1999, 2005; Oberauer, 2005), corresponds to the central executive 
in most of the working memory theories (Baddeley, 1986; Cowan, 1999; Engle, Kane, & 
Tuholski, 1999). However, our results suggest some elaboration of the notion of central 
executive. 
We assume that the role of the central executive is to form, maintain, and transform 
temporary representations held in working memory. These representations could integrate 
information from a variety of sources, as the representations stored in Baddeley’s (2000) 
episodic buffer. According to Cowan (1999, 2005), this integration could take the form of 
binding activated features of memory within the focus of attention. Such an integrative and 
constructive process is thus attention demanding (Baddeley, 2000). What is known as 
executive functions (i.e., attention shifting and focusing, memory retrieval, information 
updating and monitoring, inhibition, response selection) are processes that select and combine 
the features that form working memory representations. We assume that this system is 
constrained in three ways. The first constraint is beyond the scope of this article and concerns 
the maximum number of features that can be focused and bound to form a representation 
(Cowan, 2001, 2005; Oberauer, 2002). Second, two operations transforming the current 
working memory representation (i.e., two executive processes) could not be performed at the 
same time, leading to a sequential functioning of working memory. Third, the temporary 
nature of the representations constructed in working memory makes that as soon as a 
representation leaves the focus of attention, a time-related degradation occurs, weakening the 
activation level of its constitutive features as well as the bonds between them.  
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Thus, the disruptive effect on concurrent maintenance of any activity, i.e. its cognitive 
load, is a function of the time during which this activity occupies the central executive by 
involving executive functions that are temporarily unavailable to refresh and reconstruct 
precise representations of the memory items. Because recall performance depends on the 
integrity of the representations of these items, different processes can have the same effect on 
recall provided that they occupy the central bottleneck for equivalent periods of time, as we 
observed in Experiment 3. However, those activities that place a moderate demand on 
executive processes can have a slight and possibly negligible impact on concurrent 
maintenance. For example, a task could involve executive processes for so short periods of 
time that they are not sufficient to significantly corrupt representations of memory items. In 
Cowan’s (1999) model, it could be assumed that, in the simple RT task, the stimuli grasp 
attention automatically when they appear but do not require deep encoding because there is 
only one type of response to produce (there is no need to construct a representation of the 
target to produce the response). As a consequence, the simple RT task does not require the 
involvement of the central executive. This is probably why the simple reaction time did not 
significantly affect recall performance in Experiment 4.  
The relationships between processing and storage 
Most of the theories favor a multi-component approach of working memory in which 
processing and storage rely on different systems (Baddeley, 1996, 2000; Baddeley & Logie, 
1999; Kieras et al., 1999; Schneider & Detweiler, 1987). Accordingly, many studies have 
reported that two demanding tasks could be simultaneously performed without dual-task 
interference (Duff & Logie, 2001; see Baddeley & Logie, 1999, for a review), leading 
Cocchini et al. (2002) to recently conclude that “the dual-task findings are more readily 
explained by a multiple-resource model, with each resource functioning more or less 
independently and with demands on one resource having little impact on the efficiency of 
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other resources” (p. 1093). All of our results are at odds with this conclusion. Varying the 
demand of a silent parity judgment task or even a spatial task had a strong effect on verbal 
memory and recall. These results considerably extend the impact of the TBRS model. In all of 
our previous studies, the disruptive effect on maintenance of verbal material (either letters or 
digits) was produced by secondary tasks involving some verbal component such as reading 
digits or letters, solving arithmetic problems, or browsing the numerical chain (Barrouillet et 
al., 2004; Gavens & Barrouillet, 2004; Lépine et al., 2005). By contrast, Experiments 3 and 4  
not only involved silently processing activities, but it can be assumed that the location tasks 
did not involve any verbal component. The straightforward conclusion for these phenomena is 
that visuo-spatial processing disrupt verbal memory 
As Morey and Cowan (2005) noted, the possibility of interferences between similar, 
verbal stimuli could not be discarded in accounting for the trade-off observed by Barrouillet et 
al. (2004) between processing (reading numbers aloud) and storage (maintaining consonants). 
However, such interferences could hardly account for the phenomena observed in 
Experiments 2, 3, and 4 of the present study. It is difficult to imagine how and why the spatial 
task we used could involve some verbal recoding. At the best, it could be argued that selecting 
a response, even in a spatial task, does involve some inner speech. However, even such an 
extreme hypothesis can not account for the fact that increasing the duration of the spatial task 
in Experiment 2 had a detrimental effect on verbal memory whereas the number of stimuli, 
and thus the number of responses to be produced, remained unchanged. Thus, it seems 
improbable that the effects we observed are due to similarity-based interference. Rather, they 
suggest that, contrary to Cocchini et al. (2002), processing and storage rely on a single and 
general-purpose attentional resource. The discrepancy in results between Cocchini et al. 
(2002) and our study probably lies in methodological differences. It should be noted that our 
paradigm involves a strict control of time2. It is only under time constraints that tasks as 
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simple as judging spatial locations can disrupt concurrent maintenance of verbal information. 
When participants are allowed to perform the secondary task at their own pace, as in Cocchini 
et al. (2002), or at a moderate rate as in the easiest conditions of Experiment 7 in Barrouillet 
et al. (2004), recall performance remain practically unaffected by concurrent processing, 
something predicted by the TBRS model. Because time is the critical factor, the interactions 
between processing and storage can only be properly estimated under time control.     
Moreover, and in line with Morey and Cowan’s (2005) observations, our results tend 
to contradict the idea that verbal and spatial processing and memories are underpinned by 
modality-specific attentional capacities. Increasing the rate of the spatial location task in 
Experiment 3 resulted in a sharp decrease in verbal recall, suggesting that a shared attentional 
resource is involved rather than independent modality-specific attentional capacities. This 
does not mean that there is no code-specific storage devices such as the phonological loop 
(Baddeley & Logie, 1999), nor that some form of passive storage and attention-free 
maintenance could be achieved. Many studies have demonstrated that some passive storage 
can be surprisingly efficient without any attentional involvement (Keller et al., 1995; Naveh-
Benjamin & Jonides, 1984; Saults & Cowan, 1996). Such a passive storage could account for 
some results considered as strongly contradicting any resource-sharing model. For example, 
Duff and Logie (2001) compared the word spans obtained either through immediate verbal 
serial recall of lists or through a reading span procedure in which maintenance of words was 
combined with the reading of sentences under severe time constraints. The authors observed a 
significant reduction of memory span under combined tasks condition (from 4.75 to 3 
approximately), but they argued that if both processing and storage demands are stretching 
working memory to its capacity limits, then combining the task demands should result in a 
greater drop than observed. Is this argument compelling and would the TBRS model predict 
such a drop that all memory traces would be lost? Of course, not. The shift of attention from 
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some period of time, even without any possibility of distraction, would not necessarily result 
in a dramatic memory erasing. Considering that the reading period lasted exactly 10 s in Duff 
and Logie (2001), and that word encoding was distributed over this period as in a traditional 
Daneman and Carpenter (1980) reading span procedure, it is not so surprising that adults were 
able to recall 3 words, even if their attention was totally captured by reading and was focused 
on memory material only for short encoding episodes. What this result indicates is that 
without any probable refreshment, adults can retrieve up to 3 words from working memory 
after a delay of 10 s. However, it does not provide information about the existence or not of a 
resource sharing between processing and storage. Despite the fact that a moderate amount of 
information can be passively maintained for some period of time in short term memory, 
mundane experiences of thought, as well as our results, shows that information stored in 
working memory often suffer from the slightest distraction of attention. Thus, we turn now to 
one of the main problems of working memory, which is the loss of information.      
The loss of information from working memory 
The results of the present study suggest that information within working memory 
suffer from a time-related decay as soon as attention is switched away and captured by 
concurrent activities. However, many authors have argued against the idea that memory traces 
decay with time in short term memory. For example, Nairne (2002) claimed that it is 
relatively easy to falsify the decay theories that assume a progressive fanning of memory 
traces through time by demonstrating, as many studies did, that longer periods of retention 
can result in no memory loss or even improved recall performance (Greene, 1996; Turvey et 
al., 1970). Other models have suggested that time does not affect memory by degrading 
memory traces, but by modifying the temporal distinctiveness between items, their 
distinctiveness decreasing as the time between input and recall increases (e.g., the SIMPLE 
model; Brown & Chater, 2001; Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2002). However, predictions from 
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this model have also been ruled out by demonstrating that memory performance does not 
decline as the delay between study and recall of an item increases (Lewandowsky et al., 
2004). 
Though apparently compelling, we claim that these findings do not contradict our 
theory. First, the TBRS model does not predict that memory performance declines when the 
delay between encoding and recall increases. On the contrary, Barrouillet et al. (2004) 
predicted and observed all the possible combinations between duration of retention and 
memory performance, including better recalls through longer retention periods. This is not at 
all surprising, because what matters is not the delay between input and output, but the 
proportion of time during which attention is captured over this delay. In the same way, the 
TBRS model easily accounts for Lewandowsky et al. (2004) who observed that immediate 
serial recall performance was not disrupted when participants repeated a suppressor (“super”) 
either one, two or three times between recalls, thus increasing the delay between study and 
output. As Barrouillet et al. (2004) demonstrated, the critical factor is not the delay but the 
rate at which the intervening activity is performed. It is possible that the “super” manipulation 
did not have any effect because in all the conditions, the suppressor was uttered at the same 
rate thus leaving unchanged the cognitive load induced by this secondary task. Lewandowsky 
et al. (2004) concluded that time-based theoreticians have either to show that a time-based 
theory can handle their results or to provide new empirical evidence. We claim that the TBRS 
model takes up both parts of the challenge and that a time-related decay is the simplest 
hypothesis to account for the findings reported here. 
However, this cognitive-load-related degradation of memory traces can not in any way 
account for all the phenomena of forgetting within working memory. For example, when 
studying working memory span tasks, Lustig, May, and Hasher (2001) demonstrated the 
specific effect on recall performance of interference produced by items from antecedent test 
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trials. More recently, Conlin, Gathercole, and Adams (2005) convincingly suggested that 
complete accounts of working memory need to include mechanisms that mediate similarity-
based decrements in addition to attentional constraints and time-based forgetting described by 
the TBRS model.  The notion of similarity-based interference has been developed by Nairne 
(1990) within his feature model of immediate memory and recently extended to the domain of 
working memory by Saito and Miyake (2004) and Oberauer and colleagues (Lange & 
Oberauer, 2005; Oberauer, Lange, & Engle, 2004). Within this theoretical framework, 
similarity-based interference, or representation-based interference, occurs when 
representations generated during the processing episodes share the same features or attributes 
as the representations generated from the encoding of the to-be-remembered items. The 
greater the overlap, the greater the degree of interference and the lower the probability of 
correct recall. Saito and Miyake (2004) stressed that this account differs from the time-based 
interference because the degree of representational overlap and not the duration of 
interference determines later recall performance. Accordingly, many studies have shown that 
recall performance is better when the representations constructed for the processing and 
storage requirements are dissimilar (Bayliss et al., 2003; Conlin et al., 2005; Conlin & 
Gathercole, 2006; Shah & Miyake, 1996). However, we have already noted that this kind of 
interference could not account for the results presented here. Moreover, the TBRS model can 
account for both time- and similarity-based forgetting. 
As we suggested above, working memory representations are temporary and thus 
progressively broken down into their component features when leaving the focus of attention.   
It can be assumed that the process of reconstruction or “redintegration” (Hulme et al., 1997) 
by which memory traces are refreshed will be more difficult when the features pertaining to 
the relevant representations can not be easily distinguished from other features recently 
activated. This is the case when the representations used during processing share many 
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features with those of the memory items. The resulting overwriting process described by 
Nairne (1990) and Cowan (2005) would then lead to the construction of new and 
inappropriate links leading to incorrect retrievals and recalls. It is even possible that the sheer 
passage of time increases the probability of this similarity-based interference if the features 
and the bonds between them are weaker and weaker with time, as Posner and Konick (1966) 
proposed in the acid-bath theory.  As a consequence, although time-related decay and 
interference constitute two distinct causes of short-term forgetting that are frequently 
contrasted, they do not necessarily call for different theoretical accounts and models. The 
extensions we introduced above to the TBRS model account for both forms of forgetting 
within a unified theoretical framework. One form of forgetting is related to cognitive load 
through the occupation by concurrent activities of the executive processes needed for 
maintenance, the other to similarity-based interference and failures in the reconstructive 
process when relevant and irrelevant representations share features and overlap. Whether one 
form of forgetting is more important than the other remains an open question that necessitates 
further studies. 
Nonetheless, the present series of experiments made clear that time is one of the main 
determinants of cognitive load and mental effort. Apart from the fact that our theory 
substantiates folk conceptions of mind and daily experience in which time is a main and 
inescapable constraint, it substitutes to rather vague and metaphorical conceptions a simple 
metric to understand and evaluate cognitive load. After all, it is not so surprising that this 
metric includes time as the main factor, relating the mechanics of cognition to the physical 
laws of work and power.  
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Footnotes 
 
1. This experiment replicated Experiment 1 by comparing the Arabic and word 
conditions of the reading digit span with a condition in which digits were displayed in their 
Roman form. We used a between- rather than a within-subject design and the same span task 
procedure with the same stop criterion as Barrouillet et al. (2004). One hundred and two 
undergraduate psychology students at the Université de Bourgogne participated: 18 took part 
to the preliminary test and the remaining 84 (72 females) were randomly assigned to one of 
the three experimental conditions of the reading digit span task (either Arabic, words, and 
Roman). The preliminary test and the reading digit span were the same as in Experiment 1 
except that (a) participants had to read numbers from 1 to 9 displayed either in their Arabic, 
number word, or Roman form, (b) they were presented with only one form of numerals and 
with increasingly long series of letters from 1 to 7 until they failed to recall the letters of all 
three series at a particular level. Testing was terminated at this point. Each correctly recalled 
series counted as one third; the total number of thirds was added up to provide a span score. 
The preliminary test confirmed that it takes longer to read numbers in their Roman 
(625 ms, SD = 61) than Arabic (442 ms, SD = 45) or number word form (446 ms, SD = 39), 
F(2,34) = 204.05, !p
2 = .92, p < . 001. In line with these observations and our predictions, the 
reading digit spans varied as a function of the form in which the numbers were presented, F 
(2, 81) = 3.11, !p
2 = .07, p < .05. The Roman numerals induced lower mean spans than the 
Arabic digits (3.87, SD = 1.20, and 4.54, SD = 1.15, respectively), F (1, 81) = 4.92, !p
2 = .06, 
p < .05, and the number words (4.50, SD = 1.03), F (1, 81) = 4.40, !p
2 = .05, p < .05 . The two 
latest forms, which did not differ in reading times, elicited very similar mean spans, F < 1. 
Thus, the mean spans observed perfectly reflected what could be expected from the reading 
times. 
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2. It could be argued that presenting the memory items during 1500 ms or the stimuli 
to be processed for 1s or more, as we did here, does not allow to consider that time was 
controlled. It is true that items to be recalled are usually presented during 1000 ms (Shah & 
Miyake, 1996; Oberauer et al., 2004; Rosen & Engle, 1997; Colin & Gathercole, 2006; 
Kahana & Jacobs, 2000), but it should be remembered that this duration is rather used by 
convenience and out of habit than theoretically grounded. Longer presentations are not rare 
(1250 ms in Hale et al, 1996; 1500 ms in Miyake et al., 2001; 2000 ms in Duff & Logie, 
2001). The computer-paced nature of our tasks makes them particularly demanding, 
participants often reporting that they feel bombarded with letters and digits by a computer that 
they can not stop or even slow down. We chose these durations of presentation to prevent, as 
far as possible, such a feeling and to ascertain a comfortable completion of the tasks. 
Moreover, it should be noted that our aim in controlling time is not to prevent the participants 
from refreshing memory traces by impeding any attentional switching, but to constrain these 
refreshing activities in strictly controlled temporal boundaries. Such a control is the only way 
to grasp the subtle effects on memory maintenance of small variations in processing activities 
that would go unnoticed if participants had the possibility to organize their activity without 
restraint. Finally, these long presentation durations could only run counter our hypotheses. 
The fact that differences of about 100 ms in processing components result in significant 
differences in recall performance even though participants could probably rehearse the 
memory items can be seen as additional evidence for the impact of time in working memory. 
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Table 1 
Reading times (ms) and percentage of correctly recalled letters as a function of the 
presentation format of numbers in Experiment 1.   
 
 Reading Times  Overall Correct Recall  Ordered Correct Recall 
Conditions M SD  M SD  M SD 
Dots 507 46  87 8  75 12 
Arabic  424 45  90 7  82 11 
Word 425 45  90 6  82 13 
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Table 2 
Mean spans and standard deviations as a function of the type of judgment task 
involved as processing component and the number of stimuli to be processed within the 
interletter intervals in Experiment 3. 
 
 Type of Judgment Task  
 Parity   Location   
Number of Stimuli Mean SD  Mean SD Mean 
4 5.16 0.78  5.56 0.75 5.36 
6 4.58 1.23  5.52 0.62 5.05 
8 3.69 0.63  4.60 0.82 4.15 
Mean 4.48   5.23   
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Table 3 
Mean reaction times (RT) per stimuli and mean total processing times (!PT) per 
interletter interval as a function of the type of judgment task involved as processing 
component and the number of stimuli to be processed within the interletter intervals in 
Experiment 3. 
 
 Type of Judgment Task 
 Parity  Location 
 RT  !PT  RT  !PT 
Number of Stimuli M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
4 628 117  2467 400  484 61  1928 233 
6 551 53  3251 316  387 41  2297 239 
8 483 32  3724 218  361 39  2827 266 
Mean 554   3147   411   2351  
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Table 4 
Mean spans and standard deviations as a function of the type of reaction time task 
involved as processing component and the number of stimuli to be processed within the 
interletter intervals in Experiment 4. 
 
 
 Type of Reaction Time Task  
 Simple   Choice   
Number of Stimuli Mean SD  Mean SD Mean 
5 5.31 1.04  5.50 0.85 5.41 
7 5.25 0.68  5.10 1.03 5.18 
9 5.13 0.82  4.14 0.94 4.64 
Mean 5.23   4.92   
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Table 5 
Mean reaction times (RT) per stimuli and mean total processing times (!PT) per 
interletter interval as a function of the type of reaction time task involved as processing 
component and the number of stimuli to be processed within the interletter intervals in 
Experiment 4. 
 
 Type of Reaction Time Task 
 Simple  Choice 
 RT  !PT  RT  !PT 
Number of Stimuli M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
5 296 32  1420 158  352 39  1710 191 
7 279 31  1820 213  339 27  2254 184 
9 290 30  2390 225  337 27  2831 199 
Mean 288   1877   343   2265  
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1 
Mean spans in each experimental condition of Experiment 3 as a function of the 
proportion of time devoted to perform either the parity or the location task on the 4, 6, or 8 
stimuli presented in each interletter interval (from left to right) and linear regression line for 
each task. 
 
Figure 2 
Mean spans in each experimental condition of Experiment 4 as a function of the 
proportion of time devoted to perform either the simple or the choice RT task on the 5, 7, or 9 
stimuli presented in each interletter interval (from left to right) and linear regression line for 
each task. The rightmost point in the simple RT condition refers to the control group with 11 
stimuli.   
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